

FSD2588 ETNINEN HETEROGEEENISUUS JA ETNISET KONFLIKTIT 2003-2010

FSD2588 ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS 2003-2010

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Vanhanen, Tatu: Description of database *FSD2588 Ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflicts 2003-2010* and list of original sources

This database on the measures of ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic conflicts is connected with Tatu Vanhanen's long-term research project on the causal relationship between ethnic nepotism and the extent of ethnic conflict and violence in the world. According to his theoretical argumentation, the universality of ethnic conflict across all civilizational boundaries and over time can be traced to our common human nature, to our evolved disposition to ethnic nepotism. All human beings are assumed to share the evolved behavioral disposition to ethnic nepotism, which refers to the disposition to favour kin over non-kin in interest conflicts. The theory of ethnic nepotism is based on the sociobiological theory of kin selection, according to which it has been genetically rational to support relatives because one shares more genes with relatives than with outsiders. In fact, ethnic groups are super families, and ethnic nepotism is virtually a proxy for family nepotism.

Vanhanen's basic hypothesis is that the more deeply a population is ethnically divided, the more interest conflicts become canalized along ethnic lines. Ethnic interest conflicts are expected to emerge in all ethnically divided societies, but all ethnic conflicts do not need to escalate violent ones. This hypothesis can be tested by inventing variables to measure the significance of ethnic nepotism and the extent and intensity of ethnic conflict. Vanhanen's latest data on the measures of ethnic heterogeneity and of ethnic conflicts are presented in this database. The analysis covers 176 countries whose population was at least 200,000 inhabitants in 2005.

Measurement of ethnic nepotism

It is assumed that **ethnic heterogeneity (EH)** measures to some extent the significance and potential intensity of ethnic nepotism. Three types of ethnic divisions have been taken into account in the measurement of ethnic heterogeneity: (1) ethnic groups based on racial divisions, (2) ethnic groups based on linguistic, national, and tribal differences, and (3) ethnic groups based on stabilized old religious communities. In some countries only one type of ethnic division is significant, but in some other countries two or three types of ethnic divisions may be significant. In this database on ethnic heterogeneity, only the most significant racial, national, linguistic, tribal, or religious cleavage in a country is taken into account. Consequently, the measure is based in some cases on racial divisions and in some other cases on national, linguistic, tribal, or religious divisions. In some cases two or even three divisions may more or less overlap, for example, national and linguistic divisions, or linguistic and tribal divisions. The problem was to decide what type of ethnic cleavage is best suited to indicate the level of ethnic heterogeneity in a country. In several cases, different interpretations of the selection of the most significant ethnic division would certainly be possible. This concerns especially tribal divisions in sub-Saharan African countries. Available data on them are only rough estimations.

The measurement of ethnic heterogeneity is based on the percentage of the largest ethnic group of the total population. This percentage indicates the level of ethnic homogeneity in a country, and the inverse percentage indicates the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH). In Table 1, the name of the most significant and largest ethnic group is presented for each country as well as its percentage of the total population and the inverse percentage that indicates the level of ethnic heterogeneity (EH).

CIA's *The World Factbook 2009* has been used as the principal source of data on ethnic groups, but many other sources have also been used.

Measurement of ethnic conflicts

The nature of ethnic conflict may vary greatly from more or less peaceful economic, social, and political interest conflicts to highly violent conflicts. It is reasonable to take into account the difference between violent and nonviolent conflicts in the construction of measures of ethnic conflict.

A scale of institutionalized ethnic interest conflict (IC) is used to measure the estimated significance of principally nonviolent ethnic conflicts. It is a five-level scale whose scores vary from 1 to 5. The higher the score, the higher the estimated degree of institutionalized nonviolent ethnic conflict in a country. The following criteria have been used in these estimations:

- 1 = no significant ethnic organizations, ethnic inequalities, ethnic demonstrations, or ethnic discrimination;
- 2 = some ethnic parties or other ethnic interest organizations; noteworthy ethnic inequalities in political representation; occasional ethnic demonstrations; or institutionalized ethnic discrimination;
- 3 = significant and persistent ethnic parties and organizations; ethnic inequalities in political representation; repeated ethnic demonstrations or riots; or considerable institutionalized discrimination of some ethnic groups;
- 4 = political parties and other interest groups organized along ethnic lines extensively; ethnic inequalities in political representation cover significant ethnic groups; ethnic demonstrations or riots in many parts of the country; large ethnic groups are systematically discriminated or repressed;
- 5 = politics is dominated by ethnically based parties and other interest groups; serious ethnic inequalities in political institutions characterize the political system; ethnic mass movements and demonstrations in significant parts of the country; or discrimination and repression of significant ethnic groups dominates political and social life.

It should be noted that the criteria of institutionalized ethnic conflict complement each other, but they can also be used alternatively. To get a certain score, the country does not need to satisfy all criteria. One criterion is enough. Consequently, the scores of some countries may be principally based on the significance of ethnic parties and organizations, whereas the scores of some other countries are based on the level of institutionalized ethnic inequalities, discrimination, or ethnic demonstrations. Because the scale scores are rough estimates, it is not possible to trace them to any single source.

A scale of ethnic violence (EV) is intended to measure the relative significance of violent ethnic conflict in a country. The scope of violent ethnic conflict varies from violent demonstrations, riots, strikes, and destruction of property to attacks on persons, violent clashes between ethnic groups, or between ethnic groups and the government forces, arrests, killing of people, rebellions, terrorism, forceful deportation of people, ethnic guerrilla wars, separatist wars, ethnic civil wars, ethnic cleansings, and genocides. The scale scores of EV vary from 1 to 5. The following criteria have been used to characterize the five levels of ethnic violence:

- 1 = no information on ethnic violence, or only minor incidents principally at the level of single persons;
- 2 = occasional ethnically motivated attacks on persons; violent ethnic riots and clashes in which property destroyed; some people killed;
- 3 = repeated ethnic violences in some parts of the country; many people killed; forced deportations and ethnic refugees;
- 4 = extensive ethnic violences in significant parts of the country; ethnic rebellions or guerrilla movements; hundreds or even thousands of people killed in ethnic violences; relatively large numbers of ethnic refugees; ethnic cleansings;
- 5 = violent conflicts between ethnic groups or between ethnic groups and the government

dominate politics; ethnic civil war or serious separatist rebellion; thousands of people killed; number of refugees and displaced people may rise to hundreds of thousands; genocide.

These criteria are intended to describe the escalation of ethnic conflict from occasional clashes to genocidal civil wars. The estimated score of ethnic violence is usually based on the most serious form of ethnic violence during the period 2003-2010. The estimated score does not presuppose that the level of ethnic violence remained the same over the whole period.

The estimated scales of the institutionalized ethnic interest conflict (IC) and of ethnic violence (EV) for 176 countries, with brief references to the nature of conflicts, are presented in Table 2. Vanhanen has used these data to test his hypothesis on the causal relationship between ethnic nepotism measured by ethnic heterogeneity and the relative extent and significance of ethnic conflicts, but other users of this database are free to use the estimated data for any other purposes.

Keesing's Record of World Events (2003-2010) has been used as the principal source of ethnic conflicts, but many other sources have also been used.

List of variables

[id] Country number

[bv] Country

[v1] Additional sources used for v2, v3 and v4 (see documentation)

[v2] Largest racial national linguistic tribal or religious group

[v3] Percentage of largest ethnic group

[v4] Level of Ethnic Heterogeneity EH (inverse percentage of v3)

[v5] Additional sources used for v6, v7, v8 and v9 (see documentation)

[v6] Scale of institutionalized ethnic Interest Conflict (IC) in 2003-2010

[v7] Nature of Interest Conflict (IC)

[v8] Scale of Ethnic Violence (EV) in 2003-2010

[v9] Nature of Ethnic Violence (EV)

Sources for variables v2, v3 and v4

If not otherwise noted, data are derived from the following principal sources: CIA, *World Factbook 2009*; Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006*; *The World Guide* (2007); Banks et al. 2007; *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* (2008, online); Husain 2006; Goodwin 2007; Edge 2008; *Philip's Encyclopedic World Atlas* (2000); Morrison et al. 1972 and 1989.

Additional sources:

- **Belize.** See also "A country Study: Belize" (1993); Barnett 2002; Premdas 2002.
- **Chad.** See also Whiteman 1988.
- **Congo, Democratic Republic of.** Philips 2000: 87.
- **Cuba.** See also "Afro Cubans: Race & Identity in Cuba" (2008); Index mundi, Cuba, Ethnic groups.
- **East Timor.** East Timor Government.com 2008.
- **Lebanon.** Held 1994: 221.
- **Nepal.** Lawoti 2008.
- **Qatar.** Held 1994: 326.
- **Somalia.** Samatar 1991.
- **Sudan.** Verney et al. 1995.
- **Tajikistan.** Jawad and Tadjbakhs 1995.

Sources for variables v6, v7, v8 and v9

If not otherwise noted, estimated scales of IC and EV are based principally on data given in the following publications: *Keesing's Record of World Events, 2003-2010*; Banks et al., *Political Handbook of the World 2007* (2007), *The World Guide, Global reference, country by country* (2007); *World Conflict List*. From dKosopedia. Online; Freedom House, *Freedom in the World, 2004-2007*; Minority Rights Group International, *World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, 2007-2008*; *Minorities at Risk, 2008*; *The Africa Report, January-March 2008*; Wayne Edge, *Global Studies, Africa* (2008), Mir Zohair Husain, *Global Studies, Islam and the Muslim World* (2006); Exxun, Ethnic groups, Languages, Religions.

Additional sources:

- **Bahrain:** Tristan 2008.
- **Belize:** Premdas 2002.
- **Brazil:** Reichmann 1999.
- **Cameroon:** Chadova 2007.
- **Cuba:** Pérez-Sarovy and Stubbs 2000; Robinson 2000.
- **Eritrea:** Shale 2004.
- **Fiji:** Pirie 2000.
- **Guyana:** Misir 2002; Council on Hemispheric Affairs 2009.
- **Iran:** Bradley 2007.
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- **Nicaragua:** Brunnegger 2007.
- **Russia:** Ireland 2006.
- **Trinidad and Tobago:** Zambelis 2006.
- **Venezuela:** Wilbert 2004

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